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THE MAKING OF A CONSPIRACY: RUSSIAN EVANGELICALS 
DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR.  
by Andrey Ivanov 
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 On May 31, 2001, the Keston Institute News Service reported on a local law 
adopted by Belgorod Regional Duma aimed at restricting Protestant and all non-
Orthodox activities in Belgorod. Intended to play “a preservatory role,” as 
formulated by Belgorod bishop Ioann, the new measures essentially prohibited any 
public gatherings of the non-Orthodox where minors were present, and thus engage 
in a religious activity without their parents’ consent. The regulations also sharply 
reduced foreign missionary activity and made it virtually impossible for believers 
without their own church building to rent atriums and other facilities. It also 
expressed concern about the proliferation of foreign faiths, and missionary activities 
spreading from the neighboring Ukraine.1
 Although the law has yet to be validated by the Constitutional Court, it 
exposed some of the discrepancies between the policy of the central government 
and its enforcement in the provinces. Some of the prevailing trends within local 
administrations’ public policies towards the non-Orthodox religious groups are 
often very negative ones. It was estimated that 30 out of 89 regional governments 
adopted restrictive religious laws after 1994.2 This particular Belgorod law, as well 
 
1Geraldine Fagan. “RUSSIA: Belgorod's New Anti-Missionary Law.” Keston News 
Service, 31 May 2001. Available at http://www.keston.org/knsframe.htm  Also 
same date article by Alexander Shipkov on the impact of the law.  
2The presidential administration, however, sent briefings in almost each case 
warning of the unconstitutionality of such decisions. US Department of State 
Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 1999: Russia (Washington, 
DC: Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1999). Available online at  
www.state.gov or www.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/ statedeptrussia0909.html . 
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as the well-known 1997 act, aimed at better centralization of religious activities3 are 
far less menacing than policies exercised by other countries in the region.4 
However, they do show a significant deviation from the extraordinary laissez-faire 
religious state policy of the years between 1991-1997. With the current 
“Counteracting Anti-Extremist Activities” legislation on the table in the Federation 
Council and the lack of conscientious objectors/civil service alternative5 it is clear 
that the current religious policy of the Russian Federation is aimed at consolidating 
the mechanisms of regulation of religious activities. 
 The underlying causes for these laws certainly are a subject of debate. Yet it 
would be wrong to assume that the law adopted by the popularly elected Duma 
would reflect nothing but the populist and nationally-protectionist biases seen in the 
general society. Whereas the central government usually gets the most blame for 
restraining freedoms, it is often the local ‘bosses’ who initiate and carry out these 
restrictions by popular demand. While large segments of today’s Russia’s 
population share some of these nationalistic sentiments, it is the central and not 
local government that often attempts to mediate or suppress the militant fervor of 
some groups. This is true in cases where Putin honored Pentecostal Union President 
V. Murza in 2001 as Russia’s distinguished  minister of the year (the first time for a 
non-Orthodox) or took a stand against the growing anti-semitism.6 Nevertheless, the 
government must face criticism and responsibility for the actions of religious 
freedom violations in the provinces. This is especially relevant, given the long 
legacy of persecution that was instigated not by the local but the central 
government. 
 
315 year presence in Russia requirement for organizations to register and enjoy full 
rights in Russia. 
4Take, for example, draconian anti-public-gatherings laws in Lukashenko’s 
Belarus, or recent curbing of all non-Muslim activities in Central Asian states.  
5Nizhni Novgorod is an exception, first region to develop alternative service 
program. 
6On Murza, 14 Feb 2001 “Russia: Putin Honors Protestants” 
http://www.ripnet.org/triumphant/honor.htm  On Anti-Semitism, see description of 
Putin’s Address on the RTR Television 
http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories/080202Russia.shtml . 
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 While most Christians in the West are aware of the persecution during the 
Communist regime, often little attention is given to the repression under the Tsars. 
It is true that the persecution in the 1860s, 70s, and 80s was far less fierce, and that 
the1905 Manifesto gave a wide range of freedoms to the dissenters. Yet the onset of 
World War I resurrected some of the most reactionary conservative elements in the 
public and the government calling for a revanche against the religious minorities 
who grew and consolidated themselves between 1905 and 1914. World War one 
was a vivid example of the struggle that occurred not only in the political arena, but 
also among Evangelicals themselves on how to respond to a new political reality. 
Looking at the past, it may be easier to understand the responses and trends that 
Evangelicalism developed here in the last 90 years. 
 
WORLD WAR I AND THE RISE OF CONSPIRACY FEARS 
 The start of the First World War brought hope that the Russian Imperial 
government would ease the left-right political hostilities, which characterized the 
period of four consecutive elected Dumas. The prompt victory over Austria-
Hungary and the Germans would serve as a unifying idea for the conservatives and 
liberals alike. However, the advances of Russian troops in the fall of 1914 were 
short-lived. The year 1915 brought unexpected challenges for Russia and its 
participation in the First World War. It was a year that brought Austro-German 
troops east of the Vistula River and caused spontaneous Russian retreats from parts 
of Poland, Lithuania, Volhynia and Galicia. The year 1915 critically altered the 
military plans drawn by both the Central Powers and the Entente Cordiale. German 
hope for the blitzkrieg through Flanders and Champagne en route to Paris in 1914 
resulted in a stalemate, and hopes for pursuing considerable advances in the east by 
Russian army were only partly realized in the strenuous victories in Galicia and 
East Prussia. Meanwhile, Germany and Austria took steps to regroup their position 
in order to abandon considerable advances in the West and concentrate on the 
Eastern front instead. This resulted in 140 divisions of infantry and cavalry being 
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stationed in the east and only 91 in the west by September of 1915.7 Stronger 
pressure from the reinforced Austro-German front led to surrender by the Russians 
in Galicia, Warsaw, Kowno, the Vistula valley and other strategic locations. The 
eastward flight of refugees blocking the army’s way created miserable conditions 
amidst the troops.8 The technological and humanitarian dimensions of the war crisis 
made the prospects of the noble retreat a la 1812 seem quite dim and the General 
Staff frantically sought for ways to face the public in explaining the perplexity of 
the situation.9
 The Russian retreat itself was characterized by growing deficiencies in 
ammunition, food, communication and transportation on the front. It became clear 
that the country had to brace for a longer war than was originally planned and 
expected. The German advances in 1915 exacerbated fears of the imminent defeat 
of the Entente, and prompted more policy makers to look inward to detect any 
impediments to the war effort. As the Kaiser’s soldiers marched into Warsaw, Lodz, 
Kowno and Lutzk, there were more calls for further revision not only of Russia’s 
military but also public policy. While modifications in military doctrine attempted 
to stimulate defenses from external enemy troops, the internal public policy turned 
to search for domestic forces that would be the most likely to commit sabotage. The 
internal attack against these subversive elements was thus deemed as important as 
external defense. Initiating and also inflating such fears, the press and the public (as 
well as some governmental) opinion searched for scapegoats in their midst. Reports 
of conspiracies moved beyond the realm of sheer rumors and were heralded 
everywhere – from the rural Siberian steppes to the court of the Tsar himself. In 
1915 it was easy to find published remarks a about Jewish conspiracy, a Catholic 
conspiracy, about suspicious airplanes landing in forests belonging to Russian 
 
7A. L. Sidorov, A.N. Guliyev, et al. Istoriya  SSSR, Vol. VI ( Moscow: Nauka, 
1968) 551. For more detailed insights into the situation at the Eastern Front, see the 
discussion in Martin Gilbert, The First World War: A Complete History (New York: 
Henry Nolt &Co., 1994) 154-195. 
8Ibid., but also a good discussion of the retreat in Michael T. Florinsky, The End of 
the Russian Empire  (New York: Collier Books, 1961) 194-205. 
9Florinsky,  198-199. 
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German farmers, German-influenced Socialist propaganda in the army, as well as 
German plots in connection with the influences of Rasputin and the Tsarina on 
Nicholas II.10 Treason and lack of patriotism became a label, that was attached to 
revolutionaries, Social-Democrats, Germans, sectarians, pacifists, and to almost 
everything non-Orthodox and non-Great Russian.  
 As a result, several groups in society were questioned about their loyalty and 
patriotism toward the state. Among them were Jews, Catholics, Caucasian Muslims, 
and Russia’s ethnic Germans. The property liquidation measures of 2 February and 
13 December 1915, for example, afflicted Russian Germans' farms, while 
promising to re-distribute the land owners’ estates to the landless peasant soldiers 
on the front. The charge of pan-Germanism and social sabotage was also brought 
against Russian Evangelical sectarians: Baptists, Stundists/Evangelical Christians, 
Adventists, and some other groups. They were accused of a conspiracy to demolish 
the two pillars upon which the Empire rested: the Monarchy and the Orthodoxy. 
This essay will discuss a threefold conspiracy charge directed against the 
Evangelicals. First, the conspiracy pertained to the realm of external affairs: 
sectarians were simply the Kaiser’s tool to bring the Teutonic hordes, their faiths, 
and Kultur to Russian soil. Second, the conspiracy implicated the Evangelicals in 
internal political struggle: they were plotting together with socialists and anarchists 
to overthrow the Monarchy. Third, the conspiracy accused the Evangelicals of 
individualistic opportunism: they avoided military service and used the Bible to 
defend their pacifist beliefs. 
 The causes of these accusations must be addressed at the outset. The 
Russian reactionary forces blamed, among others, the religious dissenters because 
of the Evangelicals’ inability to create a solid position about political issues during 
the war. Their lack of organization and emphasis on individual (rather than 
 
10While the press openly criticized Rasputin’s and the Tsarina’s powers, others 
wanted to take the initiative into their hands. In 1915, the Tsar’s trusted general, 
Alekseev was involved in planning a plot to kidnap ethnically German Alexandra, 
relieving the Tsar from the pro-German influences of his wife and Rasputin. 
K.P.Kramarz, Russkiy Krizis (Paris: Rapid-Impremerie, 1925) 237-238. 
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corporate) political ethics put Evangelical sectarians on various spectrums of 
opinion about the war, the Tsar and post-1905 democracy. The ethnic Germans 
Vereins, sent their senators, bankers, and attorneys to convince the Emperor of their 
patriotism. Sectarians, on the other hand, had little economic or political influence 
and no political parties of their own. Sensitive to individualist interpretation of 
ethics and Scripture in general, Evangelicals had not developed a sense of 
denominational identity. Many decided to sustain relations with other dissenting 
and minority groups, not always because of ideology but because of their common 
plight. Among these groups were Jews, Socialists, Molokans, and Old Believers. 
Again, there was no common institution to give definition to their political attitudes, 
and there was no framework within which the Evangelicals could determine on 
which sides of the political spectrum they ought to be. Some chose one, others 
chose the other, often based on the functional sympathies of the classes they 
represented (which were mostly lower ones). 
 In short, the dissent never fully institutionalized itself before the war. 
Evangelicals were a diverse movement dating its origins back to 1860s. Some 
groups, like the Evangelical Christians, first founded ‘house churches’ back in 
1860s, but the Evangelical Christian Union was only formed in 1909, and the 
Baptist Union, in 1880. They had no confessions of faith until the early 1900s. 
Though accused of ‘Western rationalism’ by the Orthodox, the Evangelicals shared 
many common traits with the so-called ‘irrational’ sects: Molokans, Tolstovites, 
and Malevantsy. Having maintained a marginality in society, Evangelicals found 
themselves at odds with the state that demanded organized affiliation and 
unanimous support of the war.  
 
THE NATURE OF THE CONSPIRACIES 
 In January 1917, the Chief Chaplain of the Army and the Navy complained 
to Commander V. I. Romeiko-Gurko that the Evangelical soldiers likened the war 
between Germany and Russia to an ancient battle between the faithful Hebrews and 
the pagans in Palestine. They saw faithful Germans as Hebrews fighting pagan 
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Russians in the war, and “ Wilhelm as their Tsar.”11 His conclusion was that none 
of these religious dissenters were loyal, and that their faith determined their political 
allegiance. The dissent itself, however, was considered a product of a German 
conspiracy to weaken Orthodoxy by promoting Protestant beliefs. This conspiracy 
was supposedly carried over through the German settlers who were invited by 
Catherine II to colonize the South Russian steppes. Right after the start of the war, 
the Bishop of Tavrida and Simferopol Dimitriy wrote to the governor of Tavrida in 
a special report of 4 October, 1914 that, “being nurtured by Russia, Germans, who 
were invited to develop agriculture, had thanked their new fatherland by planting 
Stundism and God-hated Baptism.”12 That statement, does in fact carry some truth, 
but not in a sense of deliberate ‘planting.’ 
 Germanic settlers did play an important role in the origins of the two main 
branches of Evangelical movement in Russia – the Baptists and the Stundists 
(“Evangelical Christians”). The emergence of a new stream of Pietist and 
Evangelical renewal in the 1860s precipitated a religious ferment not only among 
isolated colonists but their Slavic neighbors as well. Johann Oncken, a Baptist 
preacher from Hamburg, arrived in Southern Russia in the 1860s, preaching not 
only among the German Baptist colonies of Novorossia, but also among 
Mennonites and Lutherans. He baptized and “ordained”13 Abraham Unger, a 
Mennonite from the village of Einlage (Kitchkass) near Alexandrovsk, who later 
 
11S. I. Golovashchenko, Istoriya Yevangel’sko-Baptistskogo Dvizheniya V 
Ukrainye: Materialy I Dokumenty (Odessa: Bogomysliye, 1998) 163. 
12“Oblagodetelstvovannye Rossiyeyu nemtsy, priglashonnye nasazhdat’ 
agrikulturu, otblagodarili svoye novoye otechestvo tem tol’ko, chto nasadili shtundu 
i bogomerzkyi baptizm.” From: Gosudarstvennyy Arkhiv Avtonomnoy Respubliki 
Krym, Simferopol. [GAARK, State Archives of the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea, Simferopol.]  Fond No. 26, Opis 3, File 911. All references below are 
based on the microfilm copy at the Center for Mennonite Brethren Studies -Fresno 
Tavrida Collection. 
13Report, submitted to the Department of Religious Affairs, 27 February, 1915. 
From: Tsentralnyy Gosudarstvenny Istoricheskiy Arkhiv Rossiyskoy Federatsii 
[TsGIARF, Central State Historical Archives of Russian Federation , St. 
Petersburg] Fond  821,Opis 133, Delo 319. CMBS-Fresno St. Petersburg 
Collection, Reel 16. 
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split away from the mainline Mennonite Church, and formed a new church of 
Mennonite Brethren, together with Gerhard Wieler and several other separatists.  
Wieler and Unger baptized many Russian and Ukrainian converts and were 
instrumental in forming the Russian Baptist Union, of which Wieler was chairman 
until 1886. 
 Yet the new formed believer groups often were able to function on their 
own, as many German preachers went into exile or were threatened with 
imprisonment.14  In the Trans-Caucasus conversions occurred under the influence of 
German Baptist Martin Kalweit.15 However, many conversions also occurred 
among the Molokans – a dissenting Old Believers’ group, which emerged 
independently of the Western influence, but possessed profound  similarities with 
the Evangelicals.16 Many ‘converts’ did not associate themselves with any union, 
and the population often christened them as “Stundists,” as their services originally 
only lasted for one hour (in German, eine Stunde), in a traditional German 
Protestant way. In the nation’s capital, St. Petersburg, Evangelical teachings spread 
also among some lower nobility, with the influences of British Lord Radstock, in 
the so-called Pashkov’s Circle. 
 Sectarians’ open friendship with the ‘Germans,’ often made it harder for the 
colonists to build their places of worship. In 1893, petitions of the Mennonites of 
Kotlyarevka, Memrik and New York to build their own prayer houses were rejected 
 
14Ibid. 
15A. V. Karev “Ruskoye Yevangel’sko-Baptistskoye Dvizheniye,” in M. S. 
Karetnikova, ed. Al’manakh Po Istorii Russkogo Baptizma (St.Petersburg: Bibliya 
Dla Vsekh, 1997) 108-109. 
16M.S. Karetnikova “Russkoye Bogoiskatel’stvo: Natsional’nyye Korni 
Yevangel’sko-Baptistskogo Dvizheniya,” Al’manakh Po Istorii Russkogo Baptizma 
(St.Petersburg: Bibliya Dla Vsekh, 1997) 66. In her article (pp.3-83), Karetnikova 
(Professor of History at St. Petersburg Christian University) conducts a thorough 
investigation of the non-Western roots of Russian Evangelicalism going back to the 
Middle Ages and Russian Renaissance of the 16th century. Hans-Christian Diedrich 
in his Siedler, Sektierer und Stundisten (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1985) 
60-79 also discusses the question of Evangelical/Baptist roots in the medieval 
dissent and the role played by the German settlers. 
 9
                                                
based on their “fanaticism and desire to convert Orthodox people.”17 In 1896, a 
number of similar applications to the Kherson and Samara gubernia were turned 
down by the governors, who feared that the church buildings would attract curious 
peasants to learn of the “German faith.”18 Of course, none of these cases were ever 
considered without consulting first with the local bishops, who generally advised 
the governors not to give permission to the colonists. 
 
‘The worshipers of the German Caesar!’ 
 
17Correspondence between Ekaterinoslav governor and Dept of Religious Affairs, 
Sept-Nov 1893. TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 5, Delo 1026. CMBS Reel 3. 
18Ibid. Correspondence of Dept of Religious Affairs with Kherson and Samara 
governors. 
 The Pobedonostzev era of 1890s signaled the worst days of persecution for these new 
groups, but in the early 1900s, the persecution subsided to the point of granting complete 
freedom in 1905. But the pressures resumed  in 1912 and 1913. In 1913, a 140 - page report was 
submitted to the 4th State Duma featuring complaints about the Evangelicals in various 
gubernias, whose prayer houses were shut down and rights to worship curbed due to accusations 
of pan-Germanism, among other things.19 Already in 1902-1903 such a charge was addressed in 
General I. I. Filipenko’s correspondence with the Bishop of Simferopol and Tavrida. The 
general, stationed in Sevastopol, criticized some of the Orthodox priests’ imputation against 
sectarians. He found that apart from being called the “Anti-Christs,” the Stundists allegedly  “are 
tools of Pan-Germanism….they worship their Caesar and are not loyal to the authorities.” On the 
other hand, Filipenko noted that some priests also “ridicule the Stundists’ honesty and loyalty, 
good way of living. ” After spending some time among them, he was appalled at the made-up 
accusations of their “worship of Germanhood,” calling them “solid Great-Russians.”20   
 By the beginning of the World War, the Evangelicals turned from being labelled  anti-
christs themselves to being charged with collecting money for “German Wilhelm, the Anti-
Christ.”21  According to a different report, it was actually Wilhelm who gave the sectarians 
money. In February 1915 the Ministry of Internal Affairs circulated a departmental report, 
Assessments of South-Russian Sectarianism,22 in which Bismarck was allegedly responsible for 
transferring a “billion[milliard] rubles” for the cause of Evangelical proselytism in Russia out of 
“political and statist motivations.”23  These motivations were formulated by German philosopher 
Hartmann that “in order to conquer the Russians, their spirit, i.e. Orthodoxy needs to be 
weakened.”24
                                                 
19TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 133, Delo 311. Reel 16. 
20 
I. I. Filipenko correspondence with the Bishop of Tavrida and Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 5, Delo 1042. CMBS Reel 23. 
21M.D. Timoshenko’s testimony, quoted in Paul D. Steeves, “The Russian Baptist Union, 1917-
1935 Evangelical Awakening in Russia”, PhD Diss. (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 
1978) 93. 
22Zaklyucheniya O Yuzhno Russkom Sektanstve TsGIARF, Fond 1292, Opis 5, Delo 340. Reel 
29. 
23Ibid. 
24Ibid. 
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 The local authorities often diligently endeavored to expose some of these secret money 
transfers.  On 15 March 1915 the Ataman of the Terek Cossack District reported on local 
observations about the church of “Evangelical Christians” in the village of Ilarionovskoye. The 
preacher of the mostly-Russian congregation, Kasper Goebbel, was found preaching “thou shalt 
not kill” to his conscripted parishioners, encouraging them to “shoot up in the air,” lest they be 
“murderers.” In response to the parishioners’ request to pray for the Tsar, the pastor responded 
that the Tsar was a “Herod leading his people to slaughter.”25 The suspicions of the authorities 
only increased after they saw Kaspar Goebbel becoming rich within his first three years of 
preaching. Goebbel went from a poor peasant to possessing a 30,000-ruble estate. During August 
1914, right before the war, he propagated with “special rigor,” while on the day of the 
proclamation of war, he gathered all his German friends in a secluded meeting in his home.26 All 
this gave the ataman enough reason to report Goebbel as a spy paid by German intelligence, and 
his preaching as indoctrinating propaganda. 
 For many public figures, the fight against the ‘indoctrination’ became essential to the war 
effort.  Vostorgov’s speech titled “A Hostile Spiritual Avant-garde” drew many supporters, as he 
presented his logic as follows: 
“We are being overridden by the German faith. The sectarian propagandists are 
demoralizing our spirit. History warns us that a cultural takeover usually precedes 
a military takeover. The Baptists and the Adventists originated in Lutheranism; 
they regularly receive financial aid and literature from Germany. It would be 
naςve to think that this help comes from German concern to save Russia. It is to 
destroy Russia. If German soldiers should appear in our streets today, we would 
fall upon them and put them behind prison walls. Yet the German faith has 
invaded us, and we do nothing. As we would war with German troops, so let us 
war with German ideas!”27  
 
 “The traitors of the Tsar and friends of the Teutons”28 carried a threat to cultural identity.  The 
governor of Tavrida prompted the Military Governor-General of Novorossia Ebelov to close the 
prayer houses in strategic coastal cities on the Black Sea not only because of the Evangelicals’ 
                                                 
25March 15, 1915 Ataman Shevchenko report to the Minister of Internal Affairs. TsGIARF, 
Fond 1292, Opis 5, Delo 340. Reel 29. 
26Ibid. 
27Summarized in Andrew Q. Blane, “The Relations Between the Russian Protestant Sects and 
the State, 1900-1921". PhD Diss. Duke University, 1964) 88. 
28Quoting 20 Feb 1915 patriotic proclamation in Kolokol.  Blane 89. 
 11
ties to Germany, but also because of the new faith’s erosion “of Russian traits in converted 
persons…and their attainment of indifference to everything Russian.”29 The Bishop of 
Simferopol argued that after one’s acceptance of Baptism, “high moral qualities of the Russian 
soul…are completely destroyed in the human being and make a person unrecognizable.”30 The 
already–mentioned Assessments outlined three main centers where German cultural propaganda 
was printed and distributed by the Evangelical preachers in Russia: “1) International Tract 
Society in Hamburg; 2) I. F. Grote Publications in Petrogradl; 3) H. J. Braun Publications in 
Halbstadt colony, Tavrida gubernia.”31
 By the end of 1914, one of the avenues of propaganda – Halbstadt’s “Raduga 
Publications” was closed. Mennonite Brethren Heinrich J. Braun and president of Evangelical 
Christian Union Ivan Prokhanov managed this enterprise. Raduga Publications was shut down on 
17 December, 1914 by order of the Odessa Military Governor-General, mainly on charges of 
pan-Germanism in both German and Russian Baptist literature that was published at Raduga. 
The former was simply linguistically unpatriotic and the latter was propagandist. Funded by local 
Germans, publishing this literature in Russian for German consumption did not make any sense, 
and thus was used to contaminate Russian minds with the ideas of “rotten Western German 
rationalistic sects.”32 In January 1915, after a series of petitions by H. Braun, “Raduga” was 
allowed to re-open, as long as no Baptist or uncensored German books were to be published 
again. Braun and Prokhanov found themselves in a  dilemma: it was unpatriotic to publish 
German books, but it was also anti-Orthodox (and thus, equally unpatriotic) to publish Russian 
Baptist ones. In June 1915, the Petrograd mayor wrote his conclusion to  the Minister of Internal 
Affairs that, “inspired by their German Adventist and Stundo-Baptist preachers, these sects have 
such a strong influence from Germany, that they, but especially Baptists, are nothing but 
nurseries of Germanism in Russia.”33
                                                 
2912 March 1915 Letter from Tavrida governor to Governor-General Ebelov, TsGIARF, Fond 
1292, Opis 5, Delo 340. Reel 29. 
30Report to Bishop Dimitriy of the priest of Maryanovka, Berdyansk uyezd Evthimiy 
Yevzhenko. 
GAARK, Fond 26, Opis 3, Delo 911. 
31Zaklyucheniye. 
32GAARK, Coll. 26, Inv. 3, File 911. Report to Bishopd Dimitriy of the priest of Maryanovka, 
Berdyansk uyezd Evthimiy Yevzhenko. 
33TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 133, Delo 331. Reel 12. 
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 On 3 August 1915, Minister of Internal Affairs Shcherbatov announced in that famous 
Duma session that “among…[the Baptists] along with those who are sincere believers, there are 
not a few undoubted tools of the German government.”34 Despite the protest on behalf of the 
Social-Democrats and especially Skobelev, the Baptist leaders continued to be exiled, and their 
hospitals and prayer houses sealed up. Later on, Father Stanislavsky of the Right party, stated in 
the Duma that the Stundists were simply “implanted” by the Germans forty years ago to initiate 
the destruction of Russia from within. He went on to allege that conscripted sectarians in the 
army “surrender at first opportunity,” and hope for Germany’s military victory so that their “true 
Evangelical faith, will flourish.”35  He then urged that a resolution be adopted to classify these 
sectarians (Stundists, Adventists and New Israelites) as subversive to the war effort, and to 
resume the persecutions of the Pobedonostzev era. Otherwise, he thought, the sectarians who 
viewed German culture as superior might themselves usher the defeat upon the Monarchy. 
 These accusations, however, prompted a series of responses from the Baptist-Evangelical 
leadership. Ivan S. Prokhanov wrote many petitions to the government calling for release of the 
imprisoned preachers and assuring Evangelicals’ support of the war effort. In one petition, he 
referred to the “heroic deeds” of his believers on the front, and presented an argument that while 
Jews or Tatar Muslims may openly profess their faith, Evangelical Christians “Russians by 
nature”[russkiye po prirodye] are denied full freedom.36  Indeed, many believers joined the army 
and supported the war. After all, in Goebbel’s case, it was his own parishioners who reported the 
pastor’s unpatriotic behavior to the authorities. Prayers for the Emperor and collections of funds 
for the war needs were commonplace among the Evangelicals, while the official Evangelical 
publications from the war period carried hardly any anti-war literature.37 Prokhanov, Pavlov and 
many others, however, realized that their believers’ attitudes towards the war could not comply 
                                                 
34John S. Curtiss, Church and State in Russia; the Last Years of the Empire, 1900-1917 (New 
York:Octagon Books, 1965) 384. 
35Ibid., 385. 
36 
Letter from 29 August 1915. TsGIARF, Fond 821,Opis 133, Delo 331. Reel 12 
37Paul D. Steeves in pages 92-94 describes manifestations of Evangelical patriotism, such as 
opening of church-sponsored hospitals for the wounded, public prayers and services for the 
victory in Moscow and victory vigils near the Winter Palace in Petrograd organized by 
Prokhanov. Also, A. I. Klibanov History of Religious Sectarianism in Russia (1860s-1917), 
trans. Ethel Dunn (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982) 332-333. Majority of patriotic manifestations, 
however, took place in large cities: Moscow, Petrograd, Ekaterinoslav, Odessa, Tiflis. 
 13
with the denominational position; because historically, there simply was none. Many Evangelical 
Christians functioned without a union for over fifty years, allowing each individual pastor and/or 
believer to interpret the war through the lenses of their own Bible reading.  The Chief Prosecutor 
of the Holy Synod was amazed at the Stundist peasants’ theology of war when they refused to 
pray for the army, stating,  
“One need not to pray for the Russian victory: for if we will pray about it, then the 
Germans will pray for their victory too, and then the war will continue without an 
end.”38
 Thus, Prokhanov and other Petersburg denominational leaders did not have many cards to 
play the note of the believers’ unanimous support for the war. Yet there was one argument that 
they sought to employ against the allegations of pan-Germanism. That  ‘card’ was a British 
connection. In the winter of 1915-1916, Petrograd’s branch of the YMCA was suddenly shut 
down on charges of spying for Germany. While Novoye Vremya praised the decision, a very 
different reaction came from its patron – Senator Graf Pahlen, an Evangelical sympathizer, who 
openly stated that the organization was of Anglo-American, and not German character, and thus 
drew suspicion from many of the Lutherans. He accused the editor of Novoye Vremya of 
ignorance, and claimed that the decision had nothing to do with its pan-Germanist character. 
There was an undeniable support for the YMCA by Petrograd’s Baptists, but the society itself 
always carried a non-denominational character. Stating that the Association was founded in 
England - Russia’s ally, Graf Pahlen concluded that the decision to close down the YMCA was 
not well thought out. He then presented the Evangelicals as true patriots, who support the war, 
prayed for the Emperor, for the victory, and collected funds for the needs of the war and the 
needs of the wounded.39  Their “brethren in England” did the same. 
 In the confidential correspondence between the Supervisor of the Department of 
Religious Affairs and the Department of Police supervisor Klimovich it was surprising that the 
government was indeed aware of the British influences over the Baptists. Citing an Okhrana 
(Russia’s secret service) report, the letter spoke of two branches of missionaries responsible for 
                                                 
385 Feb 1915, Report of Chief Prosecutor of Holy Synod to the Minister of Internal Affairs 
about the Elizavetpol gubernia peasant sectarian attitudes to war. TsGIARF, Fond 1292, Opis 5, 
Delo 340. Reel 29. 
39TsGIARF, Fond 821,Opis 133, Delo 331. Reel 12. Ivan Prokhanov to Petrograd’s 
gradonachalnik [mayor]. 
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supporting the Evangelical-Baptist movement: the Germans and Anglo-Americans. It further 
stated: 
“Under the influence of the Germans, the anti-state and anti-militarist tendencies 
are developed among the Evangelical Christians and the Baptists. The English 
organizations are trying to keep the sectarians loyal and in their publications call 
on Russian sectarians to be law-obedient.”40
 
 Despite this, the government still decided to deport Petrograd’s preacher R. Fetler  - not 
as a German spy, but as an “agent of London, funded by England and Pioneer Mission of 
America.”41 He was allegedly plotting to “help England make of Russia an English colony.”42 In 
the eyes of the reaction-minded officials, the allies in the war against German troops were not 
necessarily the allies in the war against ‘German faith.’ Later in 1916 came also a call to refuse 
the American Baptist Mission Organization  access to work among the prisoner-of-war camps in 
Russia. The ABMO was referred to as “one of the most dangerous sectarian promoters in Russia, 
funding many Evangelicals.” At its conference in America, the report claimed, the “German, 
British and Russian Baptists were seated next to each other.”43 An inter-national mélange of this 
sort was clearly a violation of the patriotic Union Sacré that sectarians needed to uphold. In that 
respect the Russian Evangelicals seemed similar (or related) to another group in Europe that 
shared the same degree of internationalist connections – the socialists. Indeed the Socialists of 
England, Russia, Germany, despite being torn by the warring nationalistic tendencies, still shared 
the same ideological persuasion and increasingly, toward the end of the war, were coming to 
hold very similar conclusions about the casus belli. 
 
“The Socialists, the Anarchists, the Cosmopolitans” 
 In May of 1878, a student from St. Petersburg Technological institute, Ivan  
                                                 
40Okhrana Report. TsGIARF, Fond 821,Opis 133, Delo 331. Reel 12 
41Ibid. 
42Steeves, 95. For a full account of Fetler’s life journey, see Oswald A. Blumit, Sentenced to 
Siberia (Wheaton, IL, 1943)  
43TSGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 133, Delo 309. Reel 12. Russia’s ecclesiastic xenophobia steered 
American Baptists to send more requests and defend their Russian fellow believers against the 
charges of pan-Germanism even after the February Revolution. Robert S. Latimer “An Open 
Letter to the Russian Minister for the Interior.” Gospel in Russia, 1917, Apr-June: 2-5. 
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Basov, appeared in the Stundist villages in Kherson gubernia, spreading “revolutionary 
propaganda” with slogans like “Down with Aristocracy!” and “People, seek your rights!” In the 
correspondence between the Kherson governor and Ministry of Internal Affairs, it was found that 
Basov’s official excuse for going there was to study the “psychology” of the Stundist sects, but 
the Ministry also suggested a connection between Basov’s revolutionary activities at home and 
his desire to see the Stundists.44 Indeed, many saw the connection between a desire for a 
religious and a social liberation, and the government in the early years of Evangelicalism saw the 
two concepts equally attractive among the peasants. “Communism is the bait with which 
Stundists catch neophytes,” said a gubernial report to Novorossia Governor-General in 1867.45  
 In 1902-1903 correspondence of General I. I. Filipenko and Bishop of Tavrida, the 
allegations of sectarian socialist affiliation seemed absurd. In March 1903 he wrote,  
“Despite the accusations of socialism and disrespect for the authorities, the 
Stundists actually propagate very conservative political views. They do not share 
socialist views on property, and are actively involved in private enterprise. They 
urge their members to pray for the Tsar and the authorities and stamp out any 
form of liberalism.”46  
 
 The conservative elements in the government, however, saw the dissenters to be more 
loyal to their international connections than to the Monarchy. In early 1900s customs and 
censorship officials seized many books, tracts and devotional literature published in England and 
Germany.47 Evangelical preachers in exile before 1905 went to places like Switzerland or 
England, rallying for foreign pressure against the suppression of religious freedom. Even after 
1905, the authorities looked at the international ‘cosmopolitan’ connections with suspicion. After 
all, it did look suspicious that sectarian leaders like Prokhanov or Mazaev, being of lower class, 
or even peasant background, enjoyed recognition and support from elite Protestant circles 
abroad. Some in the government were also afraid of those elites aiding sectarians visibly at home 
or dictating to them ideological principles. At the Baptist congress in Odessa in September of 
                                                 
44TsGIARF, Fond 1284, Opis 220, Delo 19. 
45Quoted in Klibanov, 259. 
46TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 5, Delo 1042. Reel 23. 
47Central Committee for Foreign Censorship, 23 March 1906 detailed report on intercepted 
Adventist literature from Philadelphia and Hamburg. Tracts and books describing the “mark of 
the Beast” of all those who violated the Sabbath. TsGIARF, Fond 776, Opis 12, Delo 10. Reel 
23.  
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1908, a prominent preacher from Pennsylvania declared,  “We need to elevate the poor, so that 
they reach equality with the rich.”48 During the congress in 1909 one of the foreign visitors 
preached to the public a clearly ‘Marxist’ message: “from every one according to their abilities, 
to everyone according to their need.”49 These and some other incidents prompted the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs in November of 1911 to reject the president of the Baptist Alliance Rev. 
MacAlpine’s plans to visit churches in Russia. Despite the appeals to allow MacAlpine into 
Russia, including a letter from ambassador C. Guild and recommendation from Theodore 
Roosevelt (who was, then, editor of The Outlook Magazine), the Ministry was very reluctant to 
allow him operate among Russians, citing that the Baptist Alliance was “too socialist and 
cosmopolitan.” The same year the appeal to allow St. Petersburg Evangelical Christians to open 
a seminary was denied as well.50
 Socialism and the Evangelical movement alike sustained well-developed international 
ties and maintained a closely-knit network of public agitation. Both appealed to and found 
support among the mostly lower classes. Both envisioned (especially given the Evangelicals’ 
post-millennialism) the coming of the brotherhood-of-all-men, an egalitarian society, though 
they had differing opinions about the avenues through which a future paradise might arrive. Both 
groups endured many years of mistreatment and persecution, and both had their martyrs and their 
traitors. It is no surprise that the government proclaimed both groups equally destructive to the 
war effort. They threatened the very survival of Russian ‘genuine culture,’ as they tried to 
present their own alternative to the ideals of Tsar, Faith and Motherland.  On 7 March 1915 the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs sent a secret circular to the heads of the police departments and 
gendarmerie, to increase the pressure on the sectarians and socialists alike. The circular stated 
that “close ties have been established between the destructive attempts of the revolutionaries and 
those who undermine the predominance of the Russian Orthodox Church.” Therefore, both 
groups possessed the same goal -- “to overthrow the Imperial regime.” The circular goes on to 
state that the Adventists “acquired the tendencies of anarchism,” Dukhobors exert “anti-
                                                 
48Baptist, 1908, No. 12; quoted in Golovashchenko, 154. 
49He was elaborating on the parable of Jesus about late-coming workers, underlining that 
principle as an eternal Gospel law, but not a political one. Baptist, 1909, No. 18; 
Golovashchenko, 155. 
50Correspondence between Rev. MacAlpine and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Oct-Nov 
1911. TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 133, Dielo 273. Reel 14. 
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militarism, socialism, cosmopolitism,” while the Stundists possessed “social-democratic 
tendencies.” The Baptists “not once proclaimed themselves as opponents of the current regime,” 
they aspired to a “social rebellion” and “inspire the workers to fight the Government.”51  In a 
different report, the Ministry of Interior claimed the dissenters’ wide use of revolutionary slogans 
in the church services. According to Prokhanov’s newspaper Utrennyaya Zvezda, the believers in 
Moscow instead of praying for the Tsar, prayed for the well-being of all Emperors and all 
armies, as well as for abatement of warfare.52 The secret service (Okhrana) reported  tendencies 
of “antimilitarism, socialism and cosmopolitism”53 to the Ministry of Interior many times, but 
stated that such tendencies were more common among the capital’s Baptists than Evangelical 
Union members.   
 The conspiracy of Socialist-Evangelical common plot seemed reasonable to those who 
observed the Social Democrat defense of the sectarians in the political arena even before the war. 
Following the Duma report of shutting down various places of worship on 3 May 1913, a heated 
discussion followed. During the dispute, Social Democrats Petrovsky (Bolshevik fraction) and 
Skobelev (a Menshevik) attacked the policies of harassment adopted by both Orthodox 
missionaries and local police authorities. Interrupted during their speech by some of the more 
conservative members of the Duma such as Chkheidze and Purishkevich (the latter one was 
described by Petrovsky as a “clown”), they called for an immediate resolution to stop these 
police excesses. Their proposal was protested by the reports of Father Popov of Voronezh and 
Fr. Mitrotsky from Kiev, where Baptists and sectarians were referred to as “anti-church and anti-
state.”54 Their ideas were considered revolutionary and subversive. Yet the arguments extended 
by Petrovsky and Skobelev included denunciation of religious fanaticism and religion alike. 
Proclaiming themselves atheists, they stated that sectarians’ plight interested them only because 
of their ideological motivations. They viewed sectarianism as a religious expression of the 
                                                 
51Golovashchenko, 157. 
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53TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 133, Delo 331. Reel 12. 
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masses’ craving for revolution.55 The speech itself was published in the Utrennyaya Zvezda and 
received mixed reviews from Prokhanov.   
 Among the left, there was a clear division of opinion about the Evangelicals.  A. Q. Blane 
argues that at least until 1905, Lenin fully shared the view that the sectarians would be major 
assistants in building the proletarian state.56 Lenin’s colleague Bonch-Bruyevich defended this 
position even after the Revolution. There were, however, two major impediments to the 
recognition of sectarians as a leftist revolutionary movement. First, was the lack of revolutionary 
class conscience amidst their leadership. Indeed, Baptist functionaries like D. Mazaev, Pavlov, 
Balikhin, Zakharov, while from a poorer background, ended up becoming successful 
entrepreneurs. The Baptists and Stundists alike sought not to overthrow the regime but to 
improve their situation through communal and hard work. Their sober lifestyle together with a 
network of assisting ‘brotherly help,’ fostered their economic improvement. While the majority 
never reached a status of nobility or large scale land ownership, there were many examples of 
landless peasants becoming successful artisans, village teachers, and sharecroppers.57 There were 
also some nobles affiliated with Evangelicals and often facilitating avenues of financial and 
political assistance. Baron von Korf, Countess Lieven, Baron Nikolaii, Graf Pahlen were all 
members of the capital’s aristocracy interested in the Evangelicals’ cause. The second factor was 
the movement’s essential ties to the Russian-German landowners. The Stundists and the Baptists 
learned their techniques in land cultivation, and, often enjoyed not only hiring privileges, but 
also much better treatment from their bosses in industries owned by Russian Germans.  They 
thus maintained strong contacts with their German brethren, who provided them with economic 
and religious patronage. Popular Russian writer Sholokhov, in his historical drama about the 
Russian revolution Tikhiy Don (The Quiet Don), included a remark about the four hundred 
workers in the Martens factory in Millerovo. When asked about the revolutionary activity in that 
factory, one of the characters in the story responds that “these are not real proletarians because 
they are all well-to-do. Everyone has their own house, a wife, and all kinds of luxuries. And half 
                                                 
55As a result, the Duma did not pass any of the resolutions proposed by Petrovsky and Skobelev, 
but ended instead with the adoption of unanimous congratulation telegram to His Imperial 
Majesty for the occasion of the Tsar’s May 6th birthday . 
56Blane, 118-122. 
57A. I. Klibanov places an emphasis on the kulak tendencies among the rural Evangelicals, as 
well as their cooperation with the “bourgeois upper strata of Baptism.”  pp260-266. 
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of them are Baptist. Their own boss – is their preacher, so, that one hand washes the other…”58 
Close co-operation between the dissenters and various ‘well-to-do’ brethren encouraged 
entrepreneurship and dissuaded them from open participation in revolutionary activity. 
 Being to a certain degree at odds with both the left and the right compelled Prokhanov, 
Mazaev and others to walk a thin line of appeasement to the ruling regime.  It was dangerous to 
associate with the right-wing German landowners, who supported and aided Evangelicals on 
functional levels throughout the provinces. But it was even more dangerous to claim affinity with 
the left-wing Social Democrats, and their calls to halt the war. While some of the believers 
sympathized with the Socialists, others (especially the artisans or entrepreneurs) supported the 
right-wing cause and associated closely with German farmers. The leadership, found itself at a 
loss to discourage the associations, and to develop a consistent war ethic that could be effectively 
communicated to the parishioners. This was, frankly, an impossible task. As a result, much of the 
decision was left up to the individuals, where the Evangelical leadership only went half way to 
meet the war’s demands. They prayed for peace and for the Tsar, but they failed to pray for 
victory.59   
 
‘The Unpatriotic Malingerers’ 
 Much as in other European countries, World War I in Russia kicked off with a series of 
patriotic parades and demonstrations. While the victory was considered sure and imminent, the 
war itself was proclaimed holy. In the Second Great Patriotic War, as it was called,60 Russian 
soldiers marched in  the parades with slogans and images of Mother Russia they swore to 
protect. The use of a portrait of an aged woman with teary eyes full of compassion was more 
than just a sentimental gesture to the troops. The maternal imagery was to communicate to the 
soldiers whom they defended, for whose cause they fought. Failure to keep and protect was an 
abomination in society’s eyes, an abhorrent neglect of a man’s duty. Yet, even though the 
soldiers soon realized that they were not fighting for Mother Russia but for Father Nick and 
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Uncle George, malingering and desertion were still viewed as immoral crimes in the military 
ranks. 
 They were signs of individual opportunism, and of self-preservation at the expense of 
others. Many Evangelicals were charged with these crimes. Reel 29 of the CMBS Collection 
contains several files about hundreds of Evangelical Union members, Baptists, Malevantsy, 
Tolstovtsy, Adventists who refused to take up arms or to accept the draft. Andrew Q. Blane 
states that by 1916 there were 837 sectarians who refused to be conscripted.61 Yet, this figure 
applies only to conscription. While in the army, hundreds more deserted or refused to shoot at 
the enemy. Many preached the peace message among the troops, “love your enemy” and “thou 
shalt not kill” commandments. Even the hospitals where the Evangelicals served the wounded 
were under suspicion: as early as December 1914, the General Staff prohibited the wounded 
from being sent to Petrograd’s Dom Evangeliya (“House of the Gospel” – Prokhanov’s church) 
hospital, because of the anti-militarist propaganda soldiers there received. In 1916 the hospital 
was simply closed down.62 In that year, Petrograd Evangelical churches were closed down too, 
as many soldiers attended the meetings where preachers allegedly described the war as 
“conduced by Satan, impeding the imminent coming of the Kingdom of Christ.”63 Thus, not only 
did they conspire with Germans to destroy Russian culture and with Socialists to overthrow the 
regime, but the Evangelicals now  also viewed the war as threatening their beliefs, hoping for 
soon Christ’s return. 
 At the outset of war, the Baptists and the Evangelical Union believers reassured the 
government of their support of the war effort. Some even could pinpoint military obligations as 
formulated in their official theology. The 1906 Russian Baptist Confession of faith declared the 
believers to be “obligated” [obyazany] to perform “military duty.”64 Evangelical Christian 
Confession of Faith (developed by P. M. Friesen in 1903, later revised by Prokhanov) stated that 
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‘Baptists’ or ‘Evangelical Christians,’ some avoiding to mention any denominational affiliation 
fearing that as a consequence, their ministers could be exiled. Considering also sectarians’ 
pacifism within the army ranks, it is very hard to give an adequate and final number of the 
Evangelical pacifists. 
62TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 133, Delo 331. 
63Ibid. August 11, 1916 report from Department of Religious Affairs. 
64Article XIII, Veroutcheniye Yevangel’skikh Khristian-Baptistov (Rostov-na-Donu: F. P. 
Pavlov Printing, 1906) 13. Reel 15. 
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“we consider military service to be a duty, but have fellowship with those who think 
otherwise.”65 Yet, in chapter XI of the Evangelical Christian Confession of Faith (“On the 
Freedom of the Christian and Freedom of Conscience”) believers were urged to pray to “uphold 
peace,” and “reject violence.”66 This certainly reflected some of the pacifist inclinations within 
the Evangelical community but also addressed the individual beliefs of each member. 
Throughout the year 1915, I. S. Prokhanov, kept up correspondence with the military and civil 
officials attempting to persuade them of the Evangelicals’ loyalty in service. When Novorossia 
Governor General Ebelov deported a number of ministers to Western Siberia (Tomsk region), 
Prokhanov appealed in February 1915 against the “bogus stories” (fantasticheskiye razskazy) of 
Evangelicals’ pacifism and pan-Germanism. He stated that the ministers should remain in South 
Russia to serve the parishioners whose sons went to war.67 Ebelov, in return, sent a list of 
sectarians who refused to fight or to be conscripted in Simferopol and Berdyansk uyezds, 
including a statement collected from one Evangelical, that “it is better to die from execution for 
treason, than at the slaughter [boynya].”68 In the summer of 1915, Prokhanov steered away the 
sealing of his own Petrograd congregations by providing a list of the Evangelicals who earned 
military honors at the front.69  Yet, he could not address the issue of propaganda of  
“antimilitarist ideas”  that were becoming common by late 1915.70 By the end of 1916, the 
augmentation of war fatigue was also felt among the Evangelicals. In January 1917, Chief 
chaplain of the Military and Navy reported to the Commander V. I. Romeiko-Gurko:  
“Thousands of them refuse to fight. They believe that they rather would go to jail 
than to fight, because ‘while we are in jail, your Orthodox soldiers die in the 
battles, but our life God saves for His miraculous purposes….’  Sectarians hope 
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for the revolution, which according to them, is supposed to happen soon, stating 
that ‘we would sweep you away with the palms of revolution.”71  
 
 According to him, “the sectarians in the army are more dangerous than the ones who 
refuse to take up arms.”72 Because, it is in the army that they would conduct the propaganda, 
attempting to convert other disenchanted soldiers. Their subversive behavior proved to the 
Imperial military authorities that the Evangelicals were conspiring to preserve themselves while 
letting others fight for the Monarchy. Perhaps, the enemy’s victory could even be advantageous 
to them, they thought. The antimilitarist trends were not particularly strong in the cities. In 
Prokhanov’s correspondence with the authorities, evidence of popular support and enlistment 
was documented mostly in cities – Petrograd, Moscow, Odessa, Samara. The list of the sectarian 
malingerers within the army on Reel 29 contains no persons from a major city. Most were from 
rural areas, where local pressures against Evangelicals always tended to be stronger, and the 
central government’s reach weaker. It was there, that the dissenting peasants nurtured their 
understanding of the Gospel, based on the literal approach to many passages, including the 
Sermon on the Mount. 
 The leadership’s attempt to rally unanimous support of the war among believers was 
almost as vain as the attempts of the Imperial government to fight it victoriously. Many peasant 
believers were prepared to stand by their convictions – after all, they were much better adapted 
to persecution than their brethren in Petersburg. By the early 1920s, Prokhanov courted 
Bolshevik government (with limited success) for recognition of Conscientious Objector status 
for Evangelicals, as the pacifist beliefs constituted some of their values.  Overall, the world war 
experience taught the Evangelical leadership about the dangers of political alignment, and 
contributed to their search for neutrality in relations with the state. It also attributed to future 
bitter relations between the sectarians and the militaristic Communist state, which may have 
appreciated Evangelical opposition to Tsarism on one hand, but wanted even greater loyalty, on 
the other. There was also bitterness between those originally loyal to the Tsar (who fled the 
country and formed émigré communities abroad) and new Prokhanov-style leadership seeking 
cooperation with the Soviets. Yet political non-alignment even now continues to play a 
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prominent role in shaping the framework of Evangelical-Baptist relations to the state, as these 
groups grow and consolidate themselves in the countries of the post-Soviet world. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 In a sense, the internal public policy toward the Evangelicals during World War I was the 
1905 Manifesto put on trial. Liberties that were granted in 1905-1907 were now either suspended 
or abolished. The pursuit of military victories prompted significant civil liberty restrictions. Yet, 
this state of emergency led to policies that in no way relieved the country. These limitations of 
rights and liberties as well as military losses in many ways caused a more rapid deterioration of 
the institutions of Russian monarchism and overall order inside the country. The conspiracy 
theories created to implicate the sectarians were neither provable nor successful. But they did 
produce a sense of insecurity, among believers, after so blatant a shattering of their 1905 
freedoms. 
 What followed in the 1920s were new freedoms, and significant improvements in their 
plight, but the horrors of Stalinism eradicated any hopes for a peaceful coexistence of the 
minority and the majority in Russia. It is no surprise that many Evangelicals today still view 
most freedoms with suspicion, and that the majority of Baptist-Pentecostal emigrants left the 
former Soviet Union after 1991. This was all despite the fact that precisely in 1991 the 
Evangelicals were granted the most extensive civil and religious freedoms ever. Their experience 
for the last 150 years, however, was unfortunately one of continuing bust-and-boom, emigration 
and restrictions. Only time will tell how secure they can be in the new Russia (or new 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Belarus, etc.), a country leaping to bridge the gap between itself and 
the West. 
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